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1. Introduction 
“Cultural diversity” has become one of the new buzzwords in international 
policy- and law-making. It is increasingly employed in various contexts – once as a 
term close to “biological diversity”,1 other times as correlated to the “exception 
culturelle” and most often, as a generic concept that is opposed to the negative 
effects of economic globalisation. 2  While no one has yet provided a precise 
definition of what cultural diversity is, and perhaps fortunately so, what we can 
observe is the emergence of the notion of cultural diversity as incorporating a 
distinct set of policy objectives and choices at the international level. These 
decisions are not confined, as one may expect, to the domain of cultural policy-
making, but rather spill over to multiple fields of governance, because of the 
intrinsic complex linkages related to the concurrent pursuit of economic and other 
societal goals. Thus, policy domains such as media and intellectual property rights 
protection, but also less intuitively, telecommunications and antitrust law are 
affected.  
Accounting for these complex interdependencies, we look in the following at 
the recently adopted under the auspices of the United Nations Educational 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) international instrument for the 
protection and promotion of cultural diversity and explore its main tenets. It is our 
purpose to expose the real and potential effects of the UNESCO act, both in legal 
and political terms, and to see whether it indeed provides a sufficient and 
appropriate basis for the protection and promotion of a thriving and diverse cultural 
environment. 
 
                                                     
∗ This chapter is forthcoming in Cultural Diversity: Issues, Challenges and Perspectives, New York: Nova 
Science Publishers, 2009. 
1 Article 1 of the UNESCO Declaration of Cultural Diversity of 2 November 2001 states that, “…[a]s a 
source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is 
for nature”. 
2 See below section 3. 
2 The Protection and Promotion of Cultural Diversity at the International Level 
2. Overview of main provisions of the UNESCO Convention on 
Cultural Diversity  
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions (henceforth the UNESCO Convention or just the Convention) 
was adopted by the 33rd UNESCO General Conference in 2005 with an 
overwhelming majority of 148 votes with only two countries, the United States and 
Israel, opposing.3 After an incredibly swift ratification process (the fastest ever in 
the history of the UNESCO), the Convention entered into force on 18 March 
2007.4 
Despite this so unequivocal acceptance of the Convention, its negotiation and 
drafting were rather lengthy and strenuous. They involved some hard bargaining 
and exposed yet again the starkly different perceptions of states when issues like 
culture, national identity, sovereignty, and economic freedom are at stake. The 
output of this process, which we discuss in this section, unmistakably bears the 
marks of lost (or won) power-plays and political compromise. 
2.1. The Convention’s textual basis 
The Convention’s text consists of thirty-five Articles and an Annex dealing 
with conciliation procedures. Its scope of application is defined broadly and 
ambitiously in Article 3 as covering “the policies and measures adopted by the 
Parties related to the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions”. 
2.2. Rights and Obligations of the Parties 
After an introductory part, which lays down the objectives5 and the guiding 
principles6 of the Convention, as well as contains the definitions of its underlying 
concepts,7 Part IV of the Convention follows. This Part (encompassing Articles 5 
to 19) is critical to evaluating the command and the impact of the UNESCO 
                                                     
3 Four countries, Australia, Honduras, Nicaragua and Liberia, abstained. 
4  As of 5 March 2009, 96 countries had ratified the UNESCO Convention (see 
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=31038&language=E; last accessed 1 April 2009). 
5 Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention defines as its objective: (a) to protect and promote the diversity of 
cultural expressions; (b) to create the conditions for cultures to flourish and to freely interact in a mutually 
beneficial manner; (c) to encourage dialogue among cultures with a view to ensuring wider and balanced cultural 
exchanges in the world in favour of intercultural respect and a culture of peace; (d) to foster interculturality in 
order to develop cultural interaction in the spirit of building bridges among peoples; (e) to promote respect for the 
diversity of cultural expressions and raise awareness of its value at the local, national and international levels; (f) 
to reaffirm the importance of the link between culture and development for all countries, particularly for 
developing countries, and to support actions undertaken nationally and internationally to secure recognition of the 
true value of this link; (g) to give recognition to the distinctive nature of cultural activities, goods and services as 
vehicles of identity, values and meaning; (h) to reaffirm the sovereign rights of States to maintain, adopt and 
implement policies and measures that they deem appropriate for the protection and promotion of the diversity of 
cultural expressions on their territory; (i) to strengthen international cooperation and solidarity in a spirit of 
partnership with a view, in particular, to enhancing the capacities of developing countries in order to protect and 
promote the diversity of cultural expressions. 
6 Article 2 of the UNESCO Convention formulates eight guiding principles. These are: (1) principle of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; (2) principle of sovereignty; (3) principle of equal dignity of 
and respect for all cultures; (4) principle of international solidarity and cooperation; (5) principle of the 
complementarity of economic and cultural aspects of development; (6) principle of sustainable development; (7) 
principle of equitable access; and (8) principle of openness and balance. 
7 Article 4 of the UNESCO Convention. These definitions will be looked at, where appropriate, in the 
following discussion of the Convention (below section 3). 
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Convention since it formulates the rights and obligations of the State Parties. 
Within these provisions, a key one is contained in Article 5, which affirms “the 
sovereign right [of the Parties] to formulate and implement their cultural policies 
and to adopt measures to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions 
and to strengthen international cooperation to achieve the purposes of this 
Convention”.8 Article 6 is a specification of this sovereign right with regard to 
measures promoting and protecting cultural diversity in a Party’s territory and thus 
relates sensu stricto to domestic rules. Paragraph 2 of Article 6 provides a non-
exhaustive list including eight categories of regulatory, institutional and financial 
measures that the Parties may choose to adopt. These measures are broadly defined 
and do not correspond to any particular typology of cultural policy tools.9 
Articles 7 to 11 were supposed to build the counterpart to the extensively 
defined rights of the Parties and formulate corresponding obligations. The attempt 
to incorporate real obligations was however not politically possible and what is 
presently left are mere best effort and good faith obligations expressed in the 
typical treaty language of “shall endeavour”, “shall encourage” or “may”.10 These 
so framed “duties” merely motivate the Parties to the Convention to adopt a 
number of measures, including such that (i) promote access to and dissemination of 
cultural expressions;11 (ii) address specific situations where cultural expressions are 
under serious threat of extinction;12 (iii) ensure an appropriate exchange of relevant 
information;13 (iv) encourage an enhanced public awareness of the need to protect 
cultural diversity; 14  and (v) the participation of the civil society. 15  No strong 
normative effect can be expected from any of these provisions, except perhaps for 
Article 9(a), which obliges the State Parties to report to UNESCO every four years 
on the measures taken for the protection and promotion of cultural diversity. 
While the above Articles 7-11 refer to the national level, Articles 12-19 extend 
some duties to the international level. These address the cooperation between the 
State Parties with a view of creating conditions conducive to the protection and 
promotion of cultural diversity. Many of the norms relate in particular to 
cooperation with or support of developing countries, including the establishment of 
                                                     
8 Emphasis added. 
9 Pursuant to Article 6(2), such measures may include the following: (a) regulatory measures aimed at 
protecting and promoting diversity of cultural expressions; (b) measures that, in an appropriate manner, provide 
opportunities for domestic cultural activities, goods and services among all those available within the national 
territory for the creation, production, dissemination, distribution and enjoyment of such domestic cultural activities, 
goods and services, including provisions relating to the language used for such activities, goods and services; (c) 
measures aimed at providing domestic independent cultural industries and activities in the informal sector 
effective access to the means of production, dissemination and distribution of cultural activities, goods and 
services; (d) measures aimed at providing public financial assistance; (e) measures aimed at encouraging non-
profit organizations, as well as public and private institutions and artists and other cultural professionals, to 
develop and promote the free exchange and circulation of ideas, cultural expressions and cultural activities, goods 
and services, and to stimulate both the creative and entrepreneurial spirit in their activities; (f) measures aimed at 
establishing and supporting public institutions, as appropriate; (g) measures aimed at nurturing and supporting 
artists and others involved in the creation of cultural expressions; (h) measures aimed at enhancing diversity of the 
media, including through public service broadcasting. 
10 The Preliminary Draft of the Convention (CLT-2004/CONF.201/CLD.2, Paris, July 2004), prepared by the 
International Group of Experts included not only rights but also obligations to protect and promote cultural 
diversity within their territories and internationally. 
11 Article 7 of the UNESCO Convention.  
12 Article 8 of the UNESCO Convention.  
13 Article 9 of the UNESCO Convention. 
14 Article 10 of the UNESCO Convention. 
15 Article 11 of the UNESCO Convention. 
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an International Fund for Cultural Diversity,16 which is meant to cater for the 
culturally pertinent financial needs of developing and least developed nations. 
Very interestingly, one can find in this context also two of the most far-
reaching obligations of the Convention. The first is embodied in Article 16 and 
creates a duty for developed countries to facilitate cultural exchanges with 
developing countries by granting preferential treatment to artists and other cultural 
professionals and practitioners, as well as to cultural goods and services from 
developing countries. The other duty that can be singled out is admittedly of lesser 
importance and obliges the State Parties to cooperate and assist developing 
countries in specific situations, where there is a risk of extinction or serious threat 
for cultural expressions (as defined by Article 8). 17  It is worth noting that in 
previous versions of the Convention’s text, the Parties could be obliged by the 
Intergovernmental Committee to take appropriate measures to preserve vulnerable 
cultural expressions18  (i.e. a sort of supranational interference was prescribed). 
What is left now in the treaty text is the right to take such measures and the 
mentioned cooperation engagement. 
2.3. Other provisions 
Part V of the Convention contains two norms dealing with its relationship with 
other legal instruments – Articles 20 and 21. The latter provision, in a rather non-
binding manner, encourages the Parties to promote the objectives and principles of 
the UNESCO Convention in other international forums and to consult each other 
for this purpose. The former, Article 20 of the Convention incorporates the critical 
“conflict of laws” rules and had been for this reason at the centre of intense 
discussions throughout the negotiations. Its scope remains uncertain and 
controversial, as we explain in more detail in the next analytical section. 
The last two parts of the Convention deal with matters of institutional and 
organisational nature (Part VI: Articles 22 to 24) and final clauses (Part VII: 
Articles 25 to 35). 19  The two organs foreseen under the Convention are the 
Conference of Parties (as a plenary and supreme body) 20  and the 
Intergovernmental Committee (as an executive body),21 with specific role assigned 
to the UNESCO Secretariat.22 We look at elements of these provisions, where 
relevant in the critical assessment of the Convention following hereupon. 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 Articles 14(d)(i) and 18 of the UNESCO Convention. 
17 Article 17 of the UNESCO Convention.  
18 Jan Wouters and Bart De Meester, “The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity and WTO Law: A 
Case Study in Fragmentation of International Law” (2008) Journal of Trade Law 41:1, pp. 205-240. 
19 The final clauses include: Article 25 – Settlement of disputes; Article 26 – Ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession by Member States; Article 27 – Accession; Article 28 – Point of contact; Article 29 – Entry 
into force; Article 30 – Federal or non-unitary constitutional systems; Article 31 – Denunciation; Article 32 – 
Depositary functions ; Article 33 – Amendments ; Article 34 – Authoritative texts; and Article 35 – Registration. 
20 Article 22 of the UNESCO Convention. 
21 Article 23 of the UNESCO Convention. 
22 Article 24 of the UNESCO Convention. 
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3. The UNESCO Convention: An appraisal in context 
The UNESCO Convention is not a sudden act of international goodwill but the 
pinnacle of multiple-track efforts that spread over many years23 with the objective 
of providing a binding instrument for the protection and promotion of cultural 
diversity at the international level. The Convention is thus a crystallisation of some 
previous, mostly exhortatory acts24  in the fields of culture and trade,25  and of 
cultural heritage. 26  On the other hand, it is also a clear reaction to economic 
globalisation, 27  whose advancement has been significantly furthered by the 
emergence of enforceable multilateral trade rules and whose bearer, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), has been perceived as the very antipode to “culture”. 
In this sense and this should be stressed here, the UNESCO Convention as a legally 
binding agreement was meant above all to counterbalance the WTO and fill “a 
lacuna in public international law regarding cultural values”.28  
In both of the above aspects, the UNESCO Convention has been celebrated as 
a remarkable success. Particularly contented are those state and non-state actors, 
who can be collectively referred to as proponents of the “exception culturelle” 
doctrine 29  and who have fervently for many years now argued that cultural 
products are not just commodities but “reflect who we are as a people, […] shape 
our society, develop our understanding of one another and give us a sense of pride 
in who we are as a nation”.30 Beyond this rhetoric, however, the odd thing about 
the Convention is that when one looks at it closely and construes it as a treaty basis 
for any future undertaking aimed at protecting and promoting cultural diversity, 
most of the highly optimistic labels that cultural advocates put to it simply do not 
stick. Against the above overview of the Convention’s main provisions, in the next 
section we offer a critical analysis of these31 in light of the initially stated objective 
                                                     
23 See Ivan Bernier, “A UNESCO International Convention on Cultural Diversity” in Christoph Beat Graber, 
Michael Girsberger and Mira Nenova (eds.), Free Trade versus Cultural Diversity: WTO Negotiations in the Field 
of Audiovisual Services, Zurich: Schulthess, 2004, pp. 65-76; Americo Beviglia-Zampetti, “WTO Rules in the 
Audio-Visual Sector” in Paulo Guerrieri, P. Lelio Iapadre and Georg Koopmann (eds.), Cultural Diversity and 
International Economic Integration: The Global Governance of the Audio-Visual Sector, Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2005, pp. 261-284; Tania Voon, “UNESCO and the WTO: A Clash of Cultures?” (2006) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55:3, pp. 635-652; Tania Voon, Cultural Products and the World 
Trade Organization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, at pp. 173-216. 
24  Rachael Craufurd Smith, “The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural 
Expressions: Building a New World Information and Communication Order?” (2007) International Journal of 
Communication 1, pp. 24-55, at pp. 28-29. 
25 See UNESCO, Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials, done at 
Florence, 17 June 1950 (“Florence Agreement”). The Agreement was updated with the Nairobi Protocol (done at 
Nairobi, 26 November 1976). More recent acts are the Council of Europe Declaration on Cultural Diversity, done 
at Strasbourg, 7 December 2000 and the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, done at Paris, 2 
November 2001. 
26 See e.g. UNESCO, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
done at Paris, 16 November 1972; UNESCO, Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 
done at Paris, 17 October 2003, and Council of Europe, European Landscape Convention, European Treaty Series 
No 176, done at Florence, 20 October 2000. 
27 See e.g. Christoph Beat Graber, “The New UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: A Counterbalance 
to the WTO” (2006) Journal of International Economic Law 9:3, pp. 553-574. 
28 Graber, ibid. at pp. 564-565. 
29 See e.g. Frederick Scott Galt, “The Life, Death, and Rebirth of the ‘Cultural Exception’ in the Multilateral 
Trading System: An Evolutionary Analysis of Cultural Protection and Intervention in the Face of American Pop 
Culture’s Hegemony” (2004) Washington University Global Studies Law Review 3:3, pp. 909-935. 
30 Canadian Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade (SAGIT), New Strategies for 
Culture and Trade: Canadian Culture in a Global World, 1999, at Executive Summary, paras 1-2. 
31 The UNESCO Convention has been discussed by a number of authors. See e.g. Michael Hahn, “A Clash of 
Cultures? The UNESCO Diversity Convention and International Trade Law” (2006) Journal of International 
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of this chapter to assess whether the UNESCO Convention appropriately protects 
and promotes cultural diversity in the contemporary media environment.  
3.1. Plenty of rights, no obligations 
As an act of international law, the UNESCO Convention contains certain rights 
and obligations,32 as we showed above. These are with varying degrees of binding 
intensity upon which the Parties have agreed. The UNESCO Convention has 
however precious few obligations and these are formulated as mere stimuli for the 
Parties to adopt measures for the protection and promotion of cultural diversity at 
the national and international levels, rather than as genuine duties. The only 
provision of real binding nature (Article 16) resembles the WTO’s enabling 
clause33 and relates, as noted above, to the preferential treatment for developing 
countries, whereby developed countries must facilitate cultural exchanges with 
developing countries by granting preferential treatment to cultural workers, as well 
as to cultural goods.34 If one cautiously considers this binding norm, however, its 
potential scope and impact appears quite narrow. As one well-informed 
commentator noted, “[i]ndeed, it can be argued that the main benefits are defined 
in terms of cultural cooperation and not in commercial terms. What Article 16 can 
facilitate are cultural exchanges, training, technical assistance and collaborations. 
The prospects for advancing the aims of expanding cultural industries and 
generating cultural exports are limited in scope and consequently it is difficult to 
see how Article 16 of the Convention, on its own, can adequately contribute to the 
protection and promotion of diversity of cultural expressions in a rapidly 
commercializing global cultural economy”.35 
 
Looking at the remaining duties under the UNESCO Convention, the 
vagueness of the core obligation embodied in Article 7(1) to “endeavour to create 
[…] an environment which encourages individuals and social groups: (a) to create, 
produce, disseminate, distribute and have access to their own cultural expressions, 
paying due attention to the special circumstances and needs of women as well as 
various social groups, including persons belonging to minorities and indigenous 
peoples; [and] (b) to have access to diverse cultural expressions from within their 
                                                                                                                                       
Economic Law 9:3, pp. 515-552; Graber, above note 27; Christoph Beat Graber, “Substantive Rights and 
Obligations under the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity” in Hildegard Schneider and Peter van den 
Bossche (eds.), Protection of Cultural Diversity from an International and European Perspective, Antwerpen: 
Intersentia, 2008, pp. 141-162; Craufurd Smith, above note 24; Wouters and De Meester, above note 18; Rolf H. 
Weber, “Cultural Diversity and International Trade – Taking Stock and Looking Ahead” in Kern Alexander and 
Mads Andenas (eds.), The World Trade Organization and Trade in Services, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008, 
pp. 823-843, Christopher M. Bruner, “Culture, Sovereignty, and Hollywood: UNESCO and the Future of Trade in 
Cultural Products” (2008) International Law and Politics 40, pp. 351-436, as well as the contributions to Nina 
Obuljen and Joost Smiers (eds.), UNESCO’s Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions: Making It Work, Zagreb: Institute for International Relations, 2006. 
32 Articles 5-19 of the UNESCO Convention. 
33  See GATT, Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903), Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (“Enabling Clause”). See also Bernard Hoekman, 
“More Favorable Treatment of Developing Countries: Ways Forward” in Richard Newfarmer (ed.), Trade, Doha, 
and Development: Window into the Issues, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006, pp. 213-221; Seung Wha Chang, 
“WTO for Trade and Development Post-Doha” (2007) Journal of International Economic Law 10:3, pp. 553-570. 
34 Article 16 of the UNESCO Convention. For a comprehensive analysis, see Keith Nurse, Expert Report on 
Preferential Treatment (Article 16) in the UNESCO Convention on the Protections and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions, 10 October 2008. 
35 Nurse, ibid. at p. 24. 
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territory as well as from other countries of the world”, 36  is truly astounding. 
Furthermore, no “punishment” for non-compliance is envisaged. Lack of action to 
achieve this “environment” or any of the other best endeavour obligations 
contained in Articles 7-19, as Craufurd Smith notes, “at worst, could result in a 
state being criticised by the Intergovernmental Committee or Conference of Parties 
[…] on the basis of the state’s own four yearly reports”. 37  And, while such 
reporting exercises have proven advantageous in different settings, 38  they are 
unlikely to have any value here, since there exist neither any implementation 
criteria, nor any threat of sanctions.39 Even if these reporting obligations are to be 
taken seriously by the State Parties, the reporting requirements are constrained to 
the measures that the Party has taken and not to the state of the diversity of cultural 
expressions that these measures should address.40 
 
Despite the extremely limited obligations on the Parties to take action to 
protect and promote cultural diversity, the Convention formulates an extensive 
block of rights to that end. As explained above, Article 6(2) of the UNESCO 
Convention provides a non-exhaustive list of measures that the Parties may adopt,41 
depicting “with variable clarity”42 basically all known cultural policy measures that 
states put in place, ranging from any “regulatory measures aimed at protecting and 
promoting diversity of cultural expressions”43 to the concrete example of public 
service broadcasting.44 This “all inclusive” approach signals that the Convention’s 
object has been “to endorse forms of market intervention rather than to preclude 
them”.45 
Admittedly, non-exhaustive lists are not a rare phenomenon in 
intergovernmental treaty-making. They allow, through some vagueness and 
constructive ambiguity, the bringing together of an array of (at times diverging) 
interests and the actual closing of the deal. Yet, what makes the UNESCO 
Convention peculiar in this regard is the complete lack of criteria and/or 
mechanisms that would make these definitions workable, separating the licit from 
the illicit cultural policy measures. 
This normative incompleteness is a striking feature of the UNESCO 
Convention and has been much criticised both by prominent negotiation Parties, 
notably the US,46 and by a host of scholars,47 who warn against protectionism, be it 
                                                     
36 Emphasis added. 
37 Craufurd Smith, above note 24, at p. 39 and Article 9(a) of the UNESCO Convention. 
38 For instance, in the framework of the media rules in the European Union. 
39 Craufurd Smith, above note 24, at pp. 37-38. 
40 Craufurd Smith, ibid. at p. 37. 
41 See Article 6(2)(a)-(h) of the UNESCO Convention. 
42 Hélène Ruiz Fabri, “Reflections on Possible Future Legal Implications of the Convention” in Obuljen and 
Smiers, above note 31, pp. 73-87, at p. 80.  
43 Article 6(2)(a) of the UNESCO Convention. 
44 Article 6(2)(h) of the UNESCO Convention. For an overview of the domestic cultural policy measures, see 
Mary E. Footer and Christoph Beat Graber, “Trade Liberalisation and Cultural Policy” (2000) Journal of 
International Economic Law 3:1, pp. 115-144, at pp. 122-126. 
45 Craufurd Smith, above note 24, at p. 40. In this sense, it also diverges from the contemporary theory of 
regulation seeking the slightest possible interference. See e.g. Richard R. Nelson (ed.), The Limits of Market 
Organisation, New York: Russell Sage, 2005; Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
46 The US noted in this regard: “This instrument remains too flawed, too open to misinterpretation, and too 
prone to abuse for us to support”. See “Explanation of Vote of the United States on the Convention on the 
8 The Protection and Promotion of Cultural Diversity at the International Level 
disguised or less so. It is indeed odd that while the Convention clearly 
acknowledges the dual nature of cultural goods and services and celebrates their 
cultural side,48 no attempt is made to provide guidance on how states might reduce 
the market- and trade-distorting effects of cultural policy measures. While a 
balance between the economic and cultural nature of goods, services and activities 
is undoubtedly complex, the UNESCO Convention could have at least made 
“reference to principles such as proportionality or effectiveness, which could guide 
the application of these measures and serve to prevent more blatant forms of 
protectionism”.49 This innate defect of normative incompleteness is aggravated by 
the lack of institutional or adjudicatory mechanisms that could procedurally clarify 
and complete the contract.  
The Convention’s exponents still hope that the Intergovernmental Committee 
and the Convention’s own dispute resolution will fill in some of the existing gaps, 
since both allow evolutionary advances, depending upon the willingness of the 
Parties. It should be noted however that the dispute settlement is ultimately not 
compulsory50 and the tasks of the Intergovernmental Committee, as defined in 
Article 23(6), may not provide a solid legal basis for it to engage in interpretation 
of the Convention beyond commenting on the State Parties’ reports.51 
3.2. Incompleteness of the UNESCO Convention 
Next to the almost entirely missing obligations and implementation criteria, 
one should note that the framework of the UNESCO Convention is not 
comprehensive enough to secure the protection and promotion of cultural diversity, 
leaving some critical elements outside its otherwise generously defined scope of 
application.52 Some of these missing elements are related to the centrality of state 
sovereignty, which is intrinsic to the UNESCO Convention. Indeed, the 
sovereignty of the State Parties in the cultural field is included as one of the eight 
guiding principles underpinning the Convention (Article 2(2)53) and all rights and 
obligations stemming from the Convention are attributed to states. While this is 
understandable for an intergovernmental treaty, cultural rights do not correspond to 
national boundaries. 54  The subscription to human rights and fundamental 
                                                                                                                                       
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions”, Statement by Louise V. Oliver, US 
Ambassador to UNESCO, Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, US Department of 
State, available at http://usinfo.state.gov (last accessed 1 April 2009). 
47 See above note 31. See also Mira Burri-Nenova, “Trade and Culture: Making the WTO Legal Framework 
Conducive to Cultural Considerations” (2008) Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 5:3, pp. 3-39 
and Mira Burri-Nenova, “Trade versus Culture in the Digital Environment: An Old Conflict in Need of a New 
Definition” (2009) Journal of International Economic Law 12:1, pp. 1-46. 
48 The UNESCO Convention stresses that cultural goods and services have a distinctive nature as “vehicles 
of identity, values and meaning” and that they intrinsically “embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective 
of the commercial value they may have”. See Articles 1(g) and 4(4) of the UNESCO Convention. 
49 Craufurd Smith, above note 24, at pp. 40-41. 
50 See Hahn, above note 31, at p. 533, who critically remarks that the UNESCO Convention’s dispute 
settlement is “worth mentioning only as being reminiscent of the very early days of modern international law”. 
51 See Article 23(6)(c) of the UNESCO Convention. 
52 As noted above in Article 3 of the UNESCO Convention. 
53 The principle of sovereignty reads: “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to adopt measures and policies to protect and promote the 
diversity of cultural expressions within their territory”. See also Craufurd Smith, above note 24, at p. 37. 
54 In the narrow sense we mean here, above all, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (CCPR) and Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR). See Asbjørn Eide, “Cultural Rights as Individual Human Rights” in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina 
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freedoms 55  may remedy this situation to some extent. It is nonetheless 
disappointing that specific cultural rights, which states must respect (such as access 
to education or use of language of choice) did not make it into the text, 56 in 
particular since they were acknowledged by the earlier but non-binding UNESCO 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 57  Furthermore, while the Convention does 
mention indigenous peoples and traditional cultural expressions a few times,58 the 
relevant provisions remain declarative in nature and again address not the rights of 
the indigenous peoples themselves but those of the states whose territory is affected. 
The Convention in this sense ignores recent developments in international law, 
such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007.59 Besides 
this ethnocentricity in the formulation of the rights,60 the UNESCO Convention 
establishes no specific rights for media organisations, journalists or individuals. 
Their interests are to be realised only through state action, if at all.61 
A vital piece omitted from the regulatory domain of the UNESCO Convention, 
except for the brief remark in the preamble,62 is intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
This omission is particularly awkward since IPRs have as their core objective the 
protection and promotion of creativity and innovation, and are thus an 
indispensable element of all processes related to the creation, distribution of and 
access to cultural content.63 Seeking an interface with the highly sophisticated IPR 
system could have contributed to a more balanced IPR application, including 
                                                                                                                                       
Krause and Allan Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2nd ed., The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001, pp. 289-301; Elsa Stamatopoulou, Cultural Rights in International Law, Leiden: Brill, 2007. 
55 Articles 2(1), 2(3) and 7 of the UNESCO Convention. On the relationship between the Convention and 
human rights, see Graber, above note 27, at pp.  560-563. 
56 Craufurd Smith, above note 24, at pp. 28 and 37. 
57 Article 5 of the UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity states in the relevant part that, “[a]ll persons 
have therefore the right to express themselves and to create and disseminate their work in the language of their 
choice, and particularly in their mother tongue; all persons are entitled to quality education and training that fully 
respect their cultural identity; and all persons have the right to participate in the cultural life of their choice and 
conduct their own cultural practices, subject to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. 
58 Recitals 8, 13 and 15 of the preamble, Articles 2(3) and 7(1)(a) of the UNESCO Convention. 
59  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted with General Assembly 
Resolution 61/295, 13 September 2007. 
60 See Nicole Aylwin and Rosemary J. Coombe, “Cultural Pluralism Protects Traditional Knowledge”, 2006, 
available at http://www.wacc.org.uk/wacc/publications/media_development/2006_3/cultural_pluralism_protects 
_traditional_knowledge (last accessed 1 April 2009). See also Craufurd Smith, above note 24, at p. 54. 
61 Craufurd Smith, ibid. at pp. 26 and 28. 
62 Recital 17 of the UNESCO Convention’s preamble recognises “the importance of intellectual property 
rights in sustaining those involved in cultural creativity”. Intellectual property rights used to be part of the 
definition of cultural goods and services during the drafting of the Convention. Article 7(2)(b) of the Preliminary 
Draft (CLT-2004/CONF.201/CLD.2, Paris, July 2004) provided further that Parties “shall ensure that intellectual 
property rights are fully respected and enforced according to existing international instruments, particularly 
through the development or strengthening of measures against piracy”. For a full account of the existing IPR 
references during the negotiation of the UNESCO Convention, see Laurence R. Helfer, “Towards a Human Rights 
Framework for Intellectual Property” (2007) UC Davis Law Review 40, pp. 971-1020, at pp. 1004-1006. 
63 As Tomer Broude has observed, “… intellectual property rights influence cultural change or stability in a 
number of ways. On one hand, they provide simplified channels of communication in the form of protected 
inventions, creative content, brands, titles, etc., which make the diffusion of knowledge more efficient. Such 
simplification is particularly necessary in cross-cultural exchanges, in which the heterophily of participants is 
increased due to cultural differences. In this respect, intellectual property rights may be expected to facilitate 
cultural exchange and indeed change. On the other hand, the exclusivity of intellectual property rights may raise 
the diffusion costs of new knowledge, hampering cultural exchange, or permitting it to occur only in knowledge 
areas in which the rights’ holders consider the exchange to be cost-effective, thus making it contingent on their 
particular interests. Cultural shifts might then be restrained, having lower impact on the knowledge-receiving 
society. For the same reasons, intellectual property protection may also have a preserving effect on a knowledge-
supplying society, if rights are used to protect cultural practices from dilution and abuse through duplication and 
diffusion”. See Tomer Broude, “Conflict and Complementarity in Trade, Cultural Diversity and Intellectual 
Property Rights” (2007) Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy (AJWH) 2, pp. 346-368, 
at pp. 355-356. 
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providing for a thriving public domain, which is an essential prerequisite for 
cultural creativity.64 
A significant drawback of the Convention in terms of the critical role it was 
supposed to play as a counterforce to purely economic globalisation (epitomised by 
the WTO Agreements) is to be found in its “conflict of laws” provision.65 This 
crucial norm, as provided by Article 20 of the UNESCO Convention, has fallen 
victim of unfortunate negotiating and drafting and fails short of ensuring any 
meaningful interface with the rules of the WTO (or any other of the existing 
international agreements) in case of a conflict between them.66 
Article 20 provides simultaneously that, “[n]othing in this Convention shall be 
interpreted as modifying rights and obligations of the Parties under any other 
treaties to which they are parties”, 67  and that, “without subordinating this 
Convention to any other treaty”, Parties shall foster mutual supportiveness between 
the Convention and the other treaties to which they are parties.68 Even without 
lengthy deliberations on the possible implementation and interpretation scenarios,69 
it is evident that this rather paradoxical formulation involves no modification of 
rights and obligations of the Parties under other existing treaties. Notwithstanding 
this, Parties are to take into account the relevant provisions of the Convention, 
when interpreting and applying other treaties or when entering into other 
international obligations.70 Interestingly in this context, Garry Neil has shown that 
the outcome of the only WTO case so far dealing with trade in cultural products, 
Canada−Periodicals, 71  would have been identical even if the UNESCO 
Convention had been in force at the time the decisions were taken, and regardless 
of whether the US had or had not joined the Convention.72 
Even if a new “trade versus culture” WTO case emerges, which has been the 
hope of many observers as a final resolution of the conflict through the WTO 
jurisprudence, we think it highly unlikely that such a resolution would materialise. 
Glancing at the practice of the WTO adjudication until now, it is improbable that 
the Panel (and/or the Appellate Body) would dare to radically alter the “delicate 
                                                     
64 The initiatives within the World Intellectual Property Organization in this context were not taken into 
account at all. For a fully-fledged analysis, see Neil W. Netanel, The Development Agenda, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009. 
65  On the notion of “conflict”, see Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, at pp. 5-11. 
66 For all possibilities of conflict between the norms of the WTO, the commitments of the Members under 
them, and the measures taken under the UNESCO Convention for the protection and promotion of the diversity of 
cultural expressions, see Anke Dahrendorf, “Free Trade Meets Cultural Diversity: The Legal Relationship between 
WTO Rules and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions” in 
Schneider and Van den Bossche, above note 31, pp. 31-84. See also Graber, above note 27; Wouters and De 
Meester, above note 18; Bruner, and Hahn, both above note 31. 
67 Article 20(2) of the UNESCO Convention. 
68 Article 20(1) of the Convention. 
69 See in this regard e.g. Graber, above note 27, at pp. 565-568; Hahn, above note 31, at pp. 540-546. 
70 Article 20(1) of the Convention. 
71  WTO Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Canada–Periodicals), 
WT/DS31/R, adopted 14 March 1997 and WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Concerning 
Periodicals (Canada–Periodicals), WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 June 1997.  
72 Garry Neil, “How Effectively Does the Convention Respond to the Cultural Challenges of Economic 
Globalization?”, 6 March 2006, available at http://www.suisseculture.ch/doss/ridc/x-ridc.php (last accessed 1 
April 2009), at pp. 19-21. 
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and carefully negotiated balance”73  of the WTO Agreements. Most likely, the 
adjudicative bodies would follow the conventional (less imaginative but solid) 
analysis, which justifies the legal expectations and concentrates on the core trade-
related questions that fall within the DSB’s authority74 (even though the instance of 
US−Shrimp75 still offers fruitful soil for academic debates76). 
We deem it not very plausible in this regard that the WTO adjudicatory bodies 
would substantially “soften” their standards77 with regard to applying provisions 
key to the overall functioning of the multilateral trade system, such as the general 
exceptions contained in Articles XX GATT and XIV GATS (in particular the 
chapeau test). 78  Accounting for the vagueness of the UNESCO Convention’s 
provisions, Acheson and Maule note in addition that, “Panels of the WTO cannot 
take into account fuzzy concepts of cultural diversity without losing their 
legitimacy and ultimately their effectiveness”.79 In any situation, the ongoing case 
against China and its measures affecting trading rights and distribution services for 
audiovisual entertainment products and certain publications80 offers a test bed for 
these speculations since China has made use in its argumentation of both the 
UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity and its legally binding successor.  
Closing our critical glimpse of the UNESCO Convention, we concur with 
Craufurd Smith in saying that, what we have “is a document that evades 
controversy, which establishes general objectives and frames them in purely 
exhortatory terms. As a political manifesto, with little legal substance, it is hardly 
an advance on the international declarations on cultural diversity which preceded 
                                                     
73  WTO Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, at para 177 (referring to the specific context of the 
WTO Agreement on the Applications of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)). 
74 Article 3(2) of the DSU reads: “The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognise that it serves to 
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the 
covered agreements”. 
75 WTO Panel Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US–
Shrimp), WT/DS58/R, adopted 15 May 1998, modified by WTO Appellate Body Report, United States–Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US–Shrimp), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 12 October 1998.  
76 See e.g. Graber, above note 27, at p. 567. 
77 More than the deference the WTO adjudicatory bodies have already shown towards domestic regulators. 
See e.g. Eric H. Leroux, “From Periodicals to Gambling: A Review of the Systemic Issues Addressed by WTO 
Adjudicatory Bodies under the GATS” in Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl and Pierre Sauvé (eds.), GATS and the 
Regulation of International Trade in Services, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 236-275, at 
pp. 266-270. 
78 This is in contrast to the opinion expressed by Shaffer and Pollack. See Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack, 
“How Hard and Soft Law Interact in International Regulatory Governance: Alternatives, Complements and 
Antagonists” (Paper presented at the Conference “Trade-And? The World Trade Organization’s Fuzzy Borders”, 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Geneva, 5-6 February 2009; on file with the author), 
at pp. 58-62. 
79 Keith Acheson and Christopher Maule, “Convention on Cultural Diversity” (2004) Journal of Cultural 
Economics 28, pp. 243-256, at p. 251. As Bruner also notes, “[i]f article 20 can be read to require nothing more 
than a good faith effort to interpret prior treaties in a manner consistent with the Culture Convention’s goals, then 
there is real reason to doubt that a WTO dispute resolution panel would exert itself to locate outcome-
determinative rules and principles in the Culture Convention – particularly when the little relevant WTO case law 
indicates that cultural products will not be treated differently from anything else subject to trade disciplines”. See 
Bruner, above note 31, at p. 407 (footnotes omitted). 
80 See Henry Gao, “The Mighty Pen, the Almighty Dollar and the Holy Hammer and Sickle: Examination of 
the Conflict between Trade Liberalization and Domestic Cultural Policy with Special Regard to the Recent 
Dispute between the United States and China” (2007) Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and 
Policy (AJWH) 2, pp. 313-343, at pp. 332-337 (referring to the case China–Measures Affecting Trading Rights 
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363, 16 April 
2007; current state: panel formed; reports not yet distributed). 
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it”. 81  Alternatively, and less sharply, one can plainly say that what made the 
adoption of the UNESCO Convention possible also emptied it of some of its 
valuable content. This shows on the one hand the complexity of the issues that 
arise whenever cultural diversity is to be addressed and on the other hand, in a 
political context, the starkly different sensibilities and motivation of the Parties 
when drafting a legally binding international instrument on cultural matters.82 
Exploring the interface between the UNESCO Convention and other regimes, 
the Convention will certainly influence the existing international agreements 
indirectly in the process of their interpretation. 83  Above all, the UNESCO 
Convention is likely to influence the political context of international agreements 
by changing the power-plays in negotiations and shaping the content of future 
agreements (since Parties are to take the Convention into account “when entering 
into other international obligations”84). With specific regard to the WTO, this has 
been one of the main stimuli (if not the only one) for a number of states to pursue 
the adoption of the UNESCO Convention – in particular as recent free trade 
agreements (FTAs) of the US have increased the level of liberalisation in the 
particularly sensitive domains of audiovisual services, digital trade and of 
intellectual property rights protection and enforcement.85 
4. Disconnecting trade and culture: The UNESCO Convention as part 
of the problem rather than the solution 
As already noted, much of the political muscle that led to the adoption of the 
UNESCO Convention came from the strong opposition to the effects of economic 
globalisation and the lack of adequate solutions in the WTO Agreements that 
would give Members sufficient policy space for domestic cultural policy measures. 
This being said, one needs to qualify the statement and admit that categorising the 
WTO Agreements “as solely trade-oriented and therefore culture-insensitive is not 
fully deserved”.86 Indeed, if one looks into the evolutionary path of the trade and 
culture quandary, it has been the predecessor of the WTO – the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 – that first87 accommodated some cultural 
concerns in the context of international trade after the World War II when the older 
but much smaller European industries received state protection (mostly through 
                                                     
81 Craufurd Smith, above note 24, at pp. 53-54 (footnote omitted). 
82 Ibid. at pp. 30-32. See also Caroline Pauwels, Jan Loisen and Karen Donders, “Culture Incorporated; or 
Trade Revisited? How the Position of Different Countries Affects the Outcome of the Debate on Cultural Trade 
and Diversity” in Obuljen and Smiers, above note 31, pp. 125-158. 
83 Graber, above note 27, at pp. 567 and 571; Voon (2006), above note 23, at p. 652. 
84 Article 20(1)(b) of the UNESCO Convention. 
85 Craufurd Smith, above note 24, at p. 48. See also Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The WTO, the Internet and 
Trade in Digital Products, Oxford: Hart, at pp. 201-232; Ivan Bernier, “The Recent Free Trade Agreements of the 
United States as Illustration of Their New Strategy Regarding the Audiovisual Sector”, April 2004, available at 
http://www.suisseculture.ch/doss/ridc/x-ridc.php (last accessed 1 April 2009). 
86 Wouters and De Meester, above note 18, at p. 218. 
87 In the context of UNESCO, it was only in the 1990s that the organisation took a concrete interest in 
protecting cultural diversity from the alleged negative effects of international trade and economic globalisation. 
Key steps in this process were the publication of the seminal report ‘Our Creative Diversity’ by the World 
Commission on Culture and Development in 1995 and the 1998 Stockholm Conference on Cultural Policies for 
Development. For a detailed account, see Bernier, supra note 23 and Bruner, supra note 31, at pp. 378-383. 
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import and screen quotas) against the incoming Hollywood supply.88 Article IV 
GATT was the response to these policies and while prohibiting quantitative 
restrictions of imports89  provided for some flexibility with regard to screening 
cinematograph films.90  
Next to the leeway for screen quotas expressly devised in Article IV GATT, 
plenty of other norms scattered within the body of the WTO law91 can be found 
relevant and allow certain flexibility as far as trade in cultural goods and services is 
concerned.92 In particularly, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
offers more wiggle room than the GATT,93 since the GATS framework involves 
primarily a “bottom-up” (or “positive list”) approach, whereby Members can 
choose the services sectors and sub-sectors in which they are willing to make 
national treatment or market access commitments, and can define the modalities of 
these commitments. In contrast, obligations under GATT regarding national 
treatment and quantitative restrictions apply across the board, subject to specified 
exceptions (a “top-down” or “negative list” approach).94 
The existing scope for domestic measures regarding trade in culture was 
however never found sufficient.95 The inner tension between trade and culture has 
always been there, even within the GATT 1947, as the WTO’s less far-reaching 
institutional predecessor. 96  This tension exploded during the Uruguay Round 
(1986-1994), when France and Canada fought the “exception culturelle” battle with 
                                                     
88  The European industries were also to substantial degree destroyed by the wars. At the same time, 
Hollywood was flourishing and its productions, whose access to Europe was constrained due to the war, flooded 
the market after the war. See Bruner, supra note 31, at p 367, referring to Hernan Galperin, “Cultural Industries in 
the Age of Free-Trade Agreements” (1999) Canadian Journal of Communication 24:1, pp. 49-77, at p. 68. See also 
John Trumpbour, Selling Hollywood to the World: US and European Struggles for Mastery of the Global Film 
Industry, 1920-1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
89 Article XI GATT.  
90  Article IV GATT covers “internal quantitative regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films”, 
which must take the form of “screen quotas” conforming to certain requirements (Article IV, paras (a) to (d)). 
Such quotas “may require the exhibition of cinematograph films of national origin during a specified minimum 
proportion of the total screen time actually utilized” (Article IV(a) GATT) and may “reserve a minimum 
proportion of screen time for films of a specified origin other than that of the Member imposing such screen 
quotas” (Article IV(c) GATT). On Article IV GATT, see Rostam J. Neuwirth, “The Cultural Industries and the 
Legacy of Article IV GATT: Rethinking the Relation of Culture and Trade in Light of the New WTO Round” 
(Paper presented at the Conference “Cultural Traffic: Policy, Culture, and the New Technologies in the European 
Union and Canada”, Carleton University, 22-23 November 2002). On the most infamous South-Korean screen 
quota system, see Won-Mog Choi, “Screen Quota and Cultural Diversity: Debates in Korea-US FTA Talks and 
Convention on Cultural Diversity” (2007) Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and Policy (AJWH) 
2:2, pp. 267-286. 
91 The law of the WTO is contained in several agreements, attached as annexes to the WTO Agreement that 
encompass the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). We refer to these 
as the WTO Agreements. They are contained in Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement. Other Annexes organise 
additional aspects of liberalisation such as the dispute settlement procedure (Annex 2), the trade policy review 
mechanism (Annex 3) and certain plurilateral agreements (Annex 4). 
92 For an overview of all relevant provisions, see Christoph Beat Graber, “Audiovisual Media and the Law of 
the WTO” in Graber et al., above note 23, at pp. 47-56.  
93 Graber, above note 27, at pp. 555 and 569.  
94 See generally by John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, Alan O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International 
Economic Relations, 5th ed., Eagan, MN: West, 2008. 
95 See e.g. Sandrine Cahn and Daniel Schimmel, “The Cultural Exception: Does It Exist in GATT and GATS 
Frameworks? How Does It Affect or Is It Affected by the Agreement on TRIPS?” (1997) Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 15, pp. 281-314, at pp. 287-289. 
96 See e.g. GATT, EEC–Directive on Transfrontier Television: Response to Request for Consultations under 
Article XXVII:I by the United States, DS4/4, 8 November 1989. Later WTO cases worth mentioning are WTO, 
Turkey–Taxation of Foreign Film Revenues: Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS43/1, 17 June 
1996; WTO, Turkey–Taxation of Foreign Film Revenues: Request for Establishment of a Panel by the United 
States, WT/DS43/2, 10 January 1997; and Canada–Periodicals, above note 71. For an overview, see Hahn, above 
note 31, at pp. 528-530. 
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the goal of exempting cultural services (in particular audiovisual ones) from the 
newly created agreement on services.97 The infamous “Agreement to Disagree” 
was a sort of a ceasefire, whereby GATS covers all services sectors but permits 
commitment flexibilities.98 However, it did not provide a real solution and cultural 
proponents were well aware of this. The further liberalisation commitment99 was 
impending and the MFN exemptions made were at least theoretically limited in 
time. 100  A particularly unpleasant blow to cultural exception backers was the 
Canada–Periodicals case,101 decided by the Panel and the Appellate Body to the 
benefit of the US and despite the fact that the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement 
(CUSFTA)102 envisaged a cultural exception clause.103 
 
Against this backdrop, the UNESCO Convention could be interpreted as a sort 
of “forum-shopping” – moving matters related to culture outside the WTO realm 
and seeking an impact on the negotiation processes within the WTO with a newly 
charged political strength. In this sense, while the Convention elevates “the status 
of cultural diversity as a matter of international concern, just as international 
agreements on the environment and health have helped to underline the importance 
of these considerations in other international fora such as the WTO”,104 we see this 
only partially as an advancement towards better functioning global governance 
system. Indeed, and here lies our core argument, one can view the UNESCO 
Convention as part of the problem rather than the solution. It is a sign of extreme 
disconnection between issues of trade and culture – a disconnection that does none 
of these domains good and does not reflect the recent developments in 
contemporary media markets. 
Whereas there are a number of critique points that can be formulated, we 
address here only one that is in our opinion fundamental to the whole discussion of 
cultural diversity in a global and local context, and has to do with the 
understanding of the effects of trade upon culture. This understanding is also 
                                                     
97  See Christoph Beat Graber, “Audio-visual Policy: The Stumbling Block of Trade Liberalisation” in 
Damien Geradin and David Luff (eds.), The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and 
Audiovisual Services, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 165-214; Martin Roy, “Audiovisual 
Services in the Doha Round: Dialogue de Sourds, The Sequel?” (2005) Journal of World Investment and Trade 
6:6, pp. 923-952. 
98 See Bruner, above note 31, p. 374; Galt, above note 29, at p. 914; Cahn and Schimmel, above note 95, at 
pp. 291-301. 
99  See Part IV GATS. Article XIX therein states: “In pursuance of the objectives of this Agreement, 
Members shall enter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five years from the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement and periodically thereafter, with a view to achieving a progressively 
higher level of liberalization”. 
100 The GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions states (at para 6) that, “[i]n principle, such exemptions [to 
MFN] should not exceed a period of 10 years. In any event, they shall be subject to negotiation in subsequent trade 
liberalizing rounds”. The exemptions made should have thus theoretically expired in 2005. 
101 See above note 96. 
102 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, 22 December 1987-2 January 1988, 27 ILM 281 (1988). 
103 In CUSFTA, the culture exception was coupled with a retaliation provision. Article 2005 CUSFTA 
provides that, “[c]ultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agreement”, but also that either party 
could “take measures of equivalent commercial effect in response to [such] actions”. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA; 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 289 (1993)) incorporated by reference CUSFTA this 
cultural exception. It exists only as between Canada and both the US and Mexico, but not between the US and 
Mexico. In practice, this provision comforting the Canadian cultural sector had little effect. See Cahn and 
Schimmel, above note 95, at p. 30. 
104 Craufurd Smith, above note 24, at pp. 29-30. See also Voon (2006), above note 23, at p. 652. 
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symptomatic to the formation of political antagonism, which is often detrimental to 
constructive solutions. 
 
While it is undoubted that “trade generates complex and often contradictory 
effects”,105 it is equally certain that trade is not a “zero-sum” game,106 and there are 
various ways in which trade enhances cultural flows and exchanges. In the “trade 
and culture” discourse however the common (and particularly loud) statements are 
that cultural diversity is impoverished and indeed almost extinguished as the 
globalised flow of easy entertainment coming from Hollywood dominates and 
homogenises.107 This (mis)conception108 is difficult to put right or at least soften. 
The discussion on “trade values” and “non-trade values” is extremely over-
politicised and often resembles a clash between two religions that find no 
communication path between them.  
In the specific sense of cultural policy-making, the above debate is additionally 
burdened with notions of cultural and national identity that lead to national 
sovereignty susceptibilities. In the sub-context of policy-making in audiovisual 
media, the discussion is further complicated since “one’s view on the role of media 
in society is intimately bound up with one’s view of democracy and the proper 
bounds of governmental power”.109 Ultimately, all these interrelated discourses are 
in a profound state of transition: endogenously (within the nation state), “as the 
audiovisual sector moves from being a separable and quarantined domain of 
governance to its enactment as part of a whole-of-government modelling in which 
it emerges as a service industry in a ‘digital economy’”, 110  and exogenously 
(outside the nation state), as liberalisation, migration and other forces of 
                                                     
105 The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward?, The Report of the First Warwick Commission, 
Coventry, UK: University of Warwick, 2007, at p. 26. 
106 For some classic thoughts in this regard, see Paul Krugman, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession” 
(1994) Foreign Affairs 73:2, pp. 28-44. 
107 For a critique of the cultural industries and on the homogeneity of content, see Christoph Beat Graber, 
Handel und Kultur im Audiovisionsrecht der WTO, Bern: Staempfli, 2003, at pp. 18 et seq. 
108  See e.g. Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalisation Is Reshaping Our Lives, London: 
Routledge, 2002. With regard to culture, Giddens (at p. xxiv) holds: “Western, and more specifically American, 
cultural influence is visible everywhere – in films, television, popular music and other areas. Cultural 
standardisation is an intrinsic part of this process. Yet all this is relatively superficial cultural veneer; a more 
profound effect of globalisation is to produce greater local cultural diversity, not homogeneity. The United States 
itself is the very opposite of a cultural monolith, comprising as it does a dazzling variety of different ethnic and 
cultural groups. Because of its ‘push-down’ effect […] globalisation tends to promote a renewal of local cultural 
identities. Sometimes these reflect wider world patterns, but very often they self-consciously diverge from them”. 
Tyler Cowen also insists that global monopolies and imported technologies have led to promoting local creativity 
by generating new markets for innovative, high-quality artistic productions. See Tyler Cowen, Creative 
Destruction: How Globalization Is Changing the World's Cultures, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, at 
p. 146 and Tyler Cowen, In Praise of Commercial Culture, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, in 
particular at pp. 15-43. 
109 Bruner, above note 31, at p. 432, referring also to Neil W. Netanel, “The Commercial Mass Media’s 
Continuing Fourth Estate Role” in Niva Elkin-Koren and Neil W. Netanel (eds.), The Commodification of 
Information, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp. 317-339, at pp. 317-18; C. Edwin Baker, Media, 
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globalisation 111  induce sweeping societal shifts that make modern society 
increasingly homogeneous across cultures and heterogeneous within them.112  
Under these circumstances, it becomes outdated and increasingly inappropriate 
to apply notions of cultural diversity, which “tend to favour ‘billiard ball’ 
representations of cultures as neatly bounded wholes whose contents are given and 
static. These understandings downplay ‘the ways in which meanings and symbols 
of culture are produced through complex processes of translations, negotiation and 
enunciation’, as well as by contestation and conflict”.113 To be clear, these are 
precisely the perceptions of the UNESCO Convention, whose premise is that it is 
cultural diversity between nations and not within nations that needs to be protected 
and promoted, and this stance shapes the cultural policy measures taken by the 
State Parties. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity that has been at the core of 
this chapter’s analysis is a major international endeavour that was meant to provide 
for the emancipation of certain “non-trade” values – notably, a culturally diverse 
environment – to the international scene of policy- and rule-making. The UNESCO 
Convention has succeeded in some aspects of this ambitious exercise. It has 
certainly augmented the value of cultural diversity as a legitimate public interest 
objective and it is from now on likely to be taken seriously into account when 
related international agreements are negotiated and adopted. The Convention 
would also stimulate the State Parties to design specifically targeted domestic 
measures for the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions 
and has undoubtedly given international cooperation in the field, in particular with 
developing countries, more concrete dimensions. 
Yet, the UNESCO Convention is also somewhat disappointing. As we have 
shown above, it involves no real obligations for the State Parties, has no 
enforcement or adjudicatory mechanisms, no criteria to distinguish licit from illicit 
cultural policy measures and can thus be seen as a door wide open for 
protectionism. This is likely to be especially well felt in the context of the WTO, 
where Members would refuse to further open their markets by simply waving the 
banner of cultural diversity.  
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Indeed, the case of “trade versus culture” becomes very attractive for 
politicians as the popularity of globalisation wanes, in particular in industrialised 
countries,114 and as national values and interests, especially after the 9/11, gain 
prominence.115 Yet, the politically driven disconnect between trade and culture, 
while easily justified before the respective constituencies, is not necessarily 
beneficial for either the domain of trade or that of culture. The relationship between 
the two is somehow natural and it has been in fact explicitly recognised by the 
UNESCO Convention that cultural goods and services have dual nature and 
constitute commodities that can be traded, as well as “vehicles of identity, values 
and meaning”.116 
A simple carve-out of cultural matters from the trade context and their transfer 
to the venue of UNESCO is unlikely to resolve the complex issues related to 
cultural exchanges, diversity, hybridity, global/local relationships, national 
identities, etc. This does not mean that cultural policy measures should be all 
together abandoned and that the free flow of goods and services alone will cater for 
a diversity of expressions. Yet, the benefits of the existing trade restrictions may 
very well prove not to outweigh their costs and may even be detrimental to the goal 
of cultural diversity.117 In this sense, one may indeed argue that it is within the 
mandate of the UNESCO Convention, the scope of which certainly goes beyond 
the plain reservation of “shelf-space for domestic productions in television 
programs and cinemas”,118 to encourage the ratifying Parties to dismantle some 
trade barriers and to adopt a more differentiated approach towards the matters of 
trade and culture. 
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